[Footnote 24: ADAM FERGUSON (1724-1816), is not of sufficient

importance in purely Ethical theory to demand a full abstract
[Footnote 24: ADAM FERGUSON (1724-1816), is not of sufficient
importance in purely Ethical theory to demand a full abstract. The
following remark on his views is made by Professor Veitch:--"Ferguson,
while holding-with Reid that the notion of Rightness is not resolvable
into utility, or to be derived from sympathy or a moral sense, goes a
step beyond both. Reid and Stewart in the inquiry which he raises
regarding the definite nature and ground of Rightness itself." The
following is his definition of Moral Good:--"Moral good is the specific
excellence and felicity of human nature, and moral depravity its
specific defect and wretchedness." The "excellence" of human nature
consists in four things, drawn out after the analogy of the cardinal
virtues: (1) _Skill_ (Wisdom); (2) _Benevolence_, the principal
excellence of a creature destined to perform a part in social life
(Justice); (3) _Application of mind_ (Temperance); (4) _Force_, or
energy to overcome obstacles (Fortitude). Regarding the _motives_ to
virtue, either virtue is its own reward, or divine rewards and
punishments constitute a sanction; but, in any case, the motive is our
own happiness. All the virtues enumerated are themselves useful or
pleasant, but, over and above, they give rise to an additional
pleasure, when they are made the subject of reflection.]

The condition of perfect happiness being a theoretic or intellectual

state, the _visio_, and not the _delectatio_, is consistently given as
its central fact; and when he proceeds to consider the other questions
of Ethics, the same superiority is steadily ascribed to the
intellectual function
The condition of perfect happiness being a theoretic or intellectual
state, the _visio_, and not the _delectatio_, is consistently given as
its central fact; and when he proceeds to consider the other questions
of Ethics, the same superiority is steadily ascribed to the
intellectual function. It is because we _know_ a thing to be good that
we wish it, and knowing it, we cannot help wishing. Conscience, as the
name implies, is allied to knowledge. Reason gives the law to will.